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Essay 1 focuses on purchasing behavior in the video game market, which can 
be conceptualized as a two-stage process where users first purchase a console and 
then purchase content for that console. Prior research on platform-mediated markets, 
which are defined by this interdependence in platform and content sales, has 
highlighted the relationship between installed base size (i.e. the total number of 
console adopters) and content sales. We extend this research by examining how two 
characteristics of installed bases, unrelated to size, affect content sales. First, we 
investigate the effect of installed base innovativeness, defined as the proportion of 
total adopters from early in the platform product’s lifecycle, on content sales. Next, 
we evaluate the effect of installed base recency, defined as the proportion of total 
adopters that recently adopted the platform product. We find that more innovative or 
recently adopted installed bases purchase more content on a per user basis. These 
results suggest that content sales depend on more than just installed base size, 
  
providing an opportunity to increase content sales through the identification of 
installed bases high in either innovativeness or recency.   
In Essay 2, we examine how media exposures from sponsorship can impact a 
firm’s financial performance. The extant literature has typically used aggregate 
expenditures as a proxy to study the financial effect of paid marketing 
communications. However, prior research has demonstrated that expenditures might 
not be an appropriate proxy for the overall effect of these marketing communications. 
We, therefore, study how exposures impact firm financial performance independently 
of firm expenditures used to obtain those exposures. Using a unique context (stadium 
naming rights agreements), in which the firm receives a random number of exposures, 
and leveraging the temporal nature of paid promotion in this context, we separately 
identify the effects of exposures from expenditures. In three analyses, we find that 
exposures increase firm stock returns and lower firm systematic risk, while 
promotional expenditures decrease firm stock returns and raise firm systematic risk. 
These results begin to bridge the gap in how promotional communications are 
measured between the marketing/finance interface literature and the broader literature 
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Chapter 1: The Effects of Platform and Consumer Lifecycles on 




The video game market is one of the fastest growing and largest entertainment 
markets, with an estimated $93 billion in worldwide sales in 2013.1 According to 
recent estimates, 59% of all Americans play video games, with 51% of US 
households owning at least one dedicated game console.2 This market has grown at an 
annualized rate of approximately 6% since 2000 and is projected to grow at over 12% 
per year from 2012-2015. The growth of this entertainment market has led game 
developers to allocate greater resources to the development of these games, often 
matching the development budgets of blockbuster movies. For example, Grand Theft 
Auto Five cost Rockstar Games $266 million to develop.3 As games become more 
expensive, the risk of a poorly selling game increases substantially for the game 
developer. As such, it is important to better understand how end consumers purchase 
games. 
In the video game market, consumer buying behavior is defined by a two-
stage process. In the first stage, consumers need to purchase a console, which is a 
durable electronic product that serves to allow end users to play games. After console 
                                                 
1 Source: Gartner, Inc. 
2 Source: Entertainment Software Association 




purchase, in order to generate utility, consumers then purchase content (games) for 
the console. This structure is defined as a platform-mediated market, in which a 
platform product (e.g., the gaming console) serves to link end consumers and content 
developers. Platform-mediated markets are traditional in some entertainment 
industries (i.e. video games and home video) and are expanding into other markets 
due to technological innovation (i.e. smartphones, digital music players, and e-
readers). As such, it is critical to develop a more thorough understanding of how the 
characteristics of the platform’s installed base of users affect content sales. 
 Prior research related to platform-mediated markets has focused on the 
relationship between installed base size, which is the total number of prior platform 
product adopters, and content sales. This research has found that a larger installed 
base, which indicates a larger potential market for content, leads to an increase in 
content sales (Schilling 2002; Gallaugher and Wang 2002). This relationship is 
especially crucial in entertainment content markets, such as the market for video 
games, because product sales in these markets are characterized by rapid early sales 
immediately after content release followed by an exponential decline in sales as the 
content ages (Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996; Moe and Fader 2001; Calantone et al 
2010). Therefore, it is crucial for entertainment content, such as games, to be released 
with a relatively large existing installed base. However, in this type of market, the 
availability of content is also a crucial determinant of the installed base’s size, since 
consumers generate utility based on the availability of content (Binken and 
Stremersch 2009; Lee 2013; Anderson et al. 2014), which will only be developed if 




an installed base and content sales poses a dilemma for content developers. Certain 
content developers, especially platform firms, which are major content developers in 
the video game industry (Marchand and Hennig-Thurau 2013), are dependent on the 
development of a particular installed base. As such, if the content developer only 
considers the effect of the size of the installed base, these firms need to tradeoff 
higher content sales and the development of a larger installed base when releasing 
content.  
We explore the possibility that installed base size fails to entirely capture the 
content purchasing potential of an installed base. Indeed, prior literature has shown 
that the consumers that compose an installed base can change over time (Batislam et 
al. 2007). These systematic changes in the installed base over time could potentially 
change the nature of the relationship between the installed base and content sales. 
  Therefore, in this paper, we, study how an installed base evolves over time in 
its content purchasing behavior. Building on prior research from the broader 
marketing literature, we identify two potential sources of installed base dynamics: (1) 
the innovativeness and (2) the recency of the installed base.  
First, we examine the innovativeness of the installed base by classifying users 
as “innovative” based on adoption timing within the console’s product lifecycle. 
Building on the extant literature (Ram and Jung 1994; Gandal 1999), we classify 
earlier adopters of the console as “innovative” when compared to later adopters. We 
characterize the innovativeness of the installed base using a variety of measures 
derived from the product lifecycle literature (Rogers 1962; Chandrasekaran and Tellis 




base composed of a higher proportion of early console adopters differ from an 
installed base with a higher proportion of later adopters.  
Second, we examine how the recency of the installed base affects content 
sales. We characterize the recency of an installed base by measuring the proportion of 
console users who recently purchased the platform versus previously existing 
platform users.  We also test the potential that innovativeness and recency may 
interact, suggesting that the effects of platform adoption recency might change over 
the platform product’s lifecycle. 
In order to study the effects of the innovativeness and recency of a platform’s 
installed base on content sales, we gather a variety of data from the video game 
market. Specifically, we collect weekly sales data for the three major gaming 
consoles in the seventh technological generation of the video game market along with 
data on the total weekly content sales.  We use the console sales data to construct a 
variety of metrics that characterize innovativeness and recency and examine how 
content sales respond to these metrics.  We collect total content sales associated with 
each console as well as sales for 98 specific games released on all three focal 
consoles at a title-console level (i.e. Call of Duty 3 for the PlayStation 3).  
Using this data, we model how installed base recency and innovativeness 
affects the total sales of content per user on a console system, while controlling for 
seasonality and console-specific effects. In order to do so, we evaluate the effects of 
recency and innovativeness on the total sales of content on a per user basis, which 




We find that an installed base with either higher innovativeness or recency 
purchases more content on a per user basis than an installed base with a lower 
proportion of innovative or recent consumers. We also provide evidence that these 
effects interact negatively, suggesting that later adopters of the platform product cease 
their purchasing behavior more rapidly than earlier adopters, strengthening the 
relationship between installed base recency and content sales for less innovative 
installed bases. 
Additionally, we also model the effect of installed base recency and 
innovativeness on individual title sales. The goal of this analysis is to study the effect 
of installed base recency and innovativeness on content sales while controlling for 
content quality. In order to do so, we analyze the sales of a specific content title on a 
per user basis for titles that have been released on each of the three console systems. 
As such, this analysis controls for content quality, since content quality should not 
vary for the same title across consoles, while still allowing for the study of installed 
base innovativeness and recency, as the staggered console release dates in our data 
provide variance in installed base innovativeness and recency across consoles in the 
same week.  
Our analysis at the content title level again shows that installed base 
innovativeness and recency are associated with higher content sales per installed user. 
We again estimate a significant and negative interaction effect of these metrics, which 
suggests that the effect of recently adopted consumers in an installed base is larger for 




provide evidence that installed base recency and innovativeness effects are not due to 
systematic differences in content quality released to different installed bases. 
These findings provide important insights for content managers in many 
platform-mediated markets. Our results suggest that the likelihood of content 
purchase for an installed base on a per user basis declines over time, as the proportion 
of “innovative” or “recent” consumers in an installed base decreases over time. This 
effect serves to somewhat ameliorate the effect of installed base size, which increases 
over time, on content sales. Based on these findings, content firms should seek to 
release content when installed bases have relatively high numbers of recent adopters 
of the platform product and should balance the competing effects of installed base 
size and the proportion of “innovative” consumers in the installed base. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: first, we establish a 
deeper theoretical development and our formal hypotheses.  Then, we describe our 
dataset for the empirical analysis.  Third, we provide an overview of our analyses and 
our empirical results.  Finally, we outline some managerial insights provided by our 




In this section, we briefly discuss some relevant research related to platform-
mediated markets.   We then develop the two constructs of interest for this paper: the 
innovativeness and recency of an installed base and propose hypotheses for how these 




Installed Bases within Platform-Mediated Markets 
 
Prior research in platform-mediated markets has shown the importance of 
developing a large installed base of platform users (Schilling 2002; Gallaugher and 
Wang 2002) for content developers as it increases the potential market size for their 
products. However, relatively limited research has looked at the impact of installed 
base characteristics other than size. One exception is Shankar and Bayus (2003) who 
examine the role of installed base size and strength on content sales and show how 
under some circumstances, a small installed base can prevail over a larger installed 
base if the former has higher network strength.  In a related paper on platform-
mediated markets, Lee (2013) considers the role of content availability and 
demonstrates how the availability of exclusive software impacts the industry 
structure.  However, Lee’s (2013) research focuses on how exclusivity can impact the 
sales of consoles and content in the video game market.  In this paper, we focus on 
how the qualities of the console’s installed base, based on adoption timing, affect 
content sales.  We extend the research proposed by Shankar and Bayus (2003) and 
continue to explore non-size characteristics of the installed base, but rather than 
focusing on network strength, we consider the innovativeness and the recency of the 
console’s installed base. 
 






The extant marketing literature has developed the concept of product 
lifecycles to describe the process by which a durable product diffuses through the 
market over time. Researchers have commonly described product lifecycles as 
consisting of a series of stages, generally composed of either four stages starting with 
the introduction stage followed by the growth, maturity and decline stages (Cox 1967; 
Golder and Tellis 2004) or five stages (Rogers 1962).  
 Prior research has established that the customer base evolves over the 
lifecycle of the product, with each stage of the lifecycle attracting new adopters with 
distinct characteristics (Rogers 1962; Ram and Jung 1994). For example, Rogers 
(1962) classifies new adopters into five groups, each of which first adopts the product 
at a different stage of the product lifecycle.  In the first stage, consumers consist of 
innovators which make up the first 2.5% of adopters. The next 13.5% of adopters are 
described as early adopters, and the remaining customers are described as the early 
majority (34%), the late majority (34%) and laggards (16%). 
 Other researchers have characterized adopters simply as innovators or 
imitators (van den Bulte and Joshi 2007) where innovators are driven more by an 
inherent desire for the product and imitators are more influenced by word-of-mouth 
effects.  This framing has been applied to the video game context by Gretz and 
Basuroy (2013) who classify the early stage of the platform lifecycle as the 
“Introduction” phase and suggest systematic differences between those who adopt in 
the Introduction phase versus those who adopt later.   
 Some recent research on new product takeoffs has attributed product success 




imitator population (Chandrasekaran and Tellis 2011).  What is particularly 
interesting in this stream of research is that in many cases, the takeoff is preceded by 
a dip in sales, referred to as a saddle.  This saddle has been interpreted as the point in 
time where the adopter profile shifts from that of an innovator to that of an imitator.  
This typically occurs when approximately 30% of consumers have adopted the 
durable product.  
 Overall, the above research argues that notable differences exist between 
customers who adopt a new product early versus later in the product lifecycle.  
Primarily, the innovativeness of the customer varies (Ram and Jung 1994, Schreier et 
al. 2007).  From this, we argue that a customer base comprised of a high proportion of 
early adopters is more innovative than one that includes many late adopters.  Because 
researchers have shown that these more innovative early adopters also display a 
higher involvement with the product and are more risk tolerant and thus more willing 
to try new things (Ram and Jung 1994, Steenkamp et al. 1999), we hypothesize that 
the innovativeness of the installed base is also related to content purchasing behavior.  
Namely, a more innovative installed base (as measured by adoption timing of the 
users in the installed base) will generate more content sales on a per user basis. 
 
H1: More “innovative” installed bases (i.e., those composed of a higher proportion of 
adopters from early in the platform product lifecycle) purchase more content per 
installed base member than less “innovative installed bases (i.e., those composed of a 





Installed Base Recency and Individual Consumer Lifecycles 
 
Prior research has shown how consumers’ buying behavior changes over his 
or her own consumption lifecycle (Sismeiro et al. 2012).  In other words, consumers 
who are new to the market may behave differently from those who entered the market 
earlier and are now long established members of the installed base.  Applied to the 
video game market, consumers who just bought the gaming console may differ from 
those who are already established gamers on a particular console.  Of interest to us is 
whether these differences affect how much content users buy. In order to examine this 
issue, we draw on prior consumer-level theory that suggests ways in which 
consumers may evolve in their content purchasing behavior based on how long they 
have been members of the installed base.   
 Hauser and Urban (1986) discuss the role of consumer budgets in purchasing 
behavior and propose a system in which consumers list purchases in order of 
preference and then buy the products until a budget threshold (or a threshold in which 
the product is no longer worth the price paid for the product) is reached. In our 
context, this behavior would result in a large number of game purchases early in the 
consumer’s lifecycle as this is when the budget is at its largest.  However, as 
purchases are accrued over time, not only do budget constraints become more salient 
but the games with the highest utility for the user have already been purchased.  This 
leaves the user facing the decision of whether or not to buy a less desirable game with 
his/her shrinking budget.  This dynamic over time would lead to a glut of content 




 In addition to budget considerations, the user is also trying to build a library of 
games.  The value of the gaming system to the user increases as more content is 
available.  Lee (2013) shows, at the market level, how content developers can 
increase the value of a gaming system by creating content for it.  However, at the 
level of the individual user, the value of the gaming system increases only if the 
user’s own library of games increases.  Thus, early in the consumer’s lifecycle, there 
is a need to purchase a lot of content to build the user’s library of games.  A large 
library provides higher utility for the user by offering a variety of gaming option 
(McAlister 1982; Kahn and Lehmann 1991).  Later in the consumer lifecycle, fewer 
purchases are needed to provide variety and thus content purchasing should slow. 
 Finally, we theorize that a potentially reverse causal relationship, in which 
consumers actually purchase the console in order to consume some form of content 
immediately, could also result in significant dynamics in an individual consumer’s 
content purchasing behavior. For example, Binken and Stremersch (2009) have 
shown a “superstar software” effect for the video game platform market in which 
platform product purchase is driven by the desire to purchase certain “superstar” 
content titles. If individual consumer’s console purchase is motivated specifically by 
the desire to purchase certain “superstar” content titles, we would see a very high 
amount of content purchasing associated with the console purchase itself, as 
consumers will want to obtain the utility generating component of the platform 
market, specifically content, rapidly and will then slow in their content purchasing 




 Based on these three effects (budgetary constraints, consumer variety seeking, 
and “superstar software” effects), we theorize that content sales will decline for each 
consumer as they progress to later periods in their individual consumer lifecycle. In 
order to aggregate these individual level effects into installed base-level content 
purchasing behavior, we propose the concept of installed base recency.  We define 
and measure installed base recency as the proportion of the total installed base that 
are recent adopters of the platform product (and thus are early in their individual 
consumer lifecycle).  Later in this paper, we will describe how we empirically specify 
recency and test the sensitivity of our results to different specifications.  However, 
overall, we expect that a more recent installed based will be associated with greater 
content sales per user. 
 
H2: An installed base that is high in recency, a measure of the proportion of the 
installed base that recently adopted the console, will purchase more content on a per 
user basis than an installed base that is lower in recency. 
 
Interaction between Installed Base Innovativeness and Recency 
 
 
We also test whether installed base recency and innovativeness interact. 
Again, this effect is theoretically based on individual level behaviors aggregated into 
installed base level effects. An interaction between recency and innovativeness would 
suggest that recently adopted consumers act in a different manner depending on how 




negative interaction, that would mean that later adopters purchase whatever content 
they will obtain more quickly than earlier adopters. 
Prior theory suggests that we will observe this negative interaction term. 
Specifically, the extant literature has found that early adopters use the product less 
than later adopters immediately following adoption (Prins et al. 2009). However, 
these early adopters increase their usage later in the product’s lifecycle. In our 
context, this would suggest that more innovative consumers will purchase less content 
immediately following console adoption, but will continue to purchase content for a 
long time after adoption. In comparison, later adopters will purchase their content 
rapidly, and then purchase less content later in their product lifecycle.  
Therefore, we propose that, at an installed base level, installed base recency 
will negatively interact with installed base innovativeness. This finding suggests that 
the effect of having a recently installed base on content sales will be higher when an 
installed base’s innovativeness is low, often towards the end of the platform lifecycle.  
 
H3: Installed base recency and innovativeness negatively interact, suggesting that the 
effect of being a higher recency installed base will increase content sales by more 




Our empirical data are drawn from the video game market, which is a 




platform firm in this market is the console producer, who manufactures the hardware 
used to consume content. Each firm that chooses to participate in this market as a 
platform firm produces a new console each technological generation to compete with 
other platform firms. A set of firms produce content for these consoles. End users in 
this market purchase both a console and content in order to gain utility from the 
system. A consumer needs to purchase a console each technological generation to 
utilize new content due to a lack of forward compatibility.  
Our data are drawn from the 7th technological generation of the video game 
market, which consists of three stationary consoles: the Microsoft Xbox360, Sony 
PlayStation3, and the Nintendo Wii. We restrict our analysis to these directly 
competitive consoles. We exclude portable consoles due to the limited amount of 
content released on both portable and stationary consoles, which is an especially 
crucial consideration for our data on individual content title sales. 
These data are collected from vgchartz.com, which reports weekly sales 
pertaining to video game consoles and content (games). Vgchartz.com collects and 
publishes this sales data by using a variety of methods including resale prices and the 
polling of end consumers, retailers, video game publishers, and video game 
developers to calculate the weekly sales of both video game consoles and content. 
Due to differences between regions in content and console release timing, we limit 
our data to the North American sales. 
Our data window spans an over 4 year period for each console starting with 
console launch. Given the different launch dates of each console system, we left align 




system. For the Nintendo Wii system, these data range from the week of November 
19, 2006 until the week of April 10, 2011. Our data for the Sony PlayStation 3 system 
span from the week of November 12, 2006 to April 3, 2011. Finally, our Microsoft 
Xbox 360 data window is from the week of November 20, 2005 to the week of April 
11, 2010. We also collect the total sales for each console prior to October 2014, to 
evaluate when certain sales thresholds were met. 
We divide our data into three separate datasets: (1) console sales data, (2) total 
content sales, and (3) individual content title sales data. Each of these datasets will be 
combined to test our hypotheses in our statistical analyses. 
 
Console Sales Data 
  
Our console sales data report the cumulative console sales for a particular 
console prior to an observation week, which represents the size of a console’s 
installed base in each week. We collect 230 observations of weekly sales data for 
each console, for a total of 690 console sales observations. These data allow us to 
both measure the relative innovativeness and recency of an installed base and provide 
an installed base size that serves to transform content sales into a per user measure. 
Figure i plots the total annual sales for each console during our analysis 
period. As can be seen in this figure, the product launches are staggered, with the 
Xbox360 being released a year earlier than either the PlayStation3 or the Wii. In other 




either the PS3 or the Wii, resulting in substantially different values for installed base 
innovativeness for the three console systems during the same week. 
 
Figure i: Annual North American Console Sales 
 
* Partial years not displayed. 
 
Total Content Sales Data 
 
For each console, we collect the weekly total content sales, which are the sales 
of all content titles on a particular console system in the focal week. Matching our 
console sales data, we collect 230 observations of total content sales for each console 
system, resulting in 690 total observations across the three console systems. These 
data are used to evaluate the effects of both installed base recency and innovativeness.  
Figure ii provides the annual total content sales for each console system. As 




platform product. The console systems with the largest installed bases also have the 
highest total content sales in each year. This provides model-free evidence of the 
effect of installed base size on content sales in the video game market. 
 
 Figure ii: Total Content Sales by Year 
 
 
Individual Title Sales Data 
 
Finally, we collect the sales of individual content titles. These data contain the 
sales of 98 titles that were released on all three consoles during our data window. We 
gather the weekly sales of each individual content title for each of the three focal 
consoles.  
Individual title sales patterns for content in the video game market match that 
of other entertainment content markets such as music and movies. Each of these 
markets is characterized by high initial product sales followed by an exponential 




pattern with high initial sales followed by exponential declines. In Figure iii, we show 
the weekly sales for “Call of Duty: World at War” on the Sony PlayStation 3. Figure 
iv shows the weekly sales for “Ghostbusters: The Video Game” on the Nintendo Wii. 
 
Figure iii: Sales of “Call of Duty: World at War” 
 





This sales pattern results in a high proportion of total sales for a content title 
occurring in the first ten weeks after product release. We provide further evidence of 
this in Table i, which describes the sales of individual content titles in each of the first 
ten weeks after the content titles are released. Content title sales decline rapidly in the 
first ten weeks, with the mean sales of an individual content title in week 10 only 
constituting 17% of the mean sales of titles in the first week that the content is 
available for purchase.  
Table i: Individual Title Sales Data Description by Week 




1 58,081.89 152-889,647 
2 25,856.99 122-388,081 
3 19,035.94 117-320,217 
4 16,600.83 203-233,183 
5 16,913.00 151-324,287 
6 17,296.83 125-404,077 
7 15,523.46 111-325,954 
8 13,474.66 93-258,874 
9 11,544.99 85-196,634 
10 9,672.74 71-84,185 
 
Models and Results 
 
Total Content Sales Model 
 
In order to evaluate the effects of installed base recency and innovativeness, 
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Our dependent variable for this analysis is the total sales of content per 
installed base user. The use of a per user transformation allows us to identify the 
effects of installed base recency and innovativeness separated from the effects of 
installed base size. We operationalize this measure as the log transformed total 
content sales (contentjt) divided by the size of the installed base (IBjt) for console j in 
week t. We model this measure as a function of installed base innovativeness 
(Innovjt), recency (Recencyjt), and their interaction effect.  We also include indicator 
variables to control for the console (Xboxj and PS3j) as well as seasonality (Seast).   
In the North American video game market, from which our data sample is drawn, 
sales increase in the last week in November and the first four weeks of December. 
Seast is an indicator variable for an observation week being within those five weeks.  
In order to measure installed base innovativeness, we consider a number of 
specifications for Innovjt.  This allows us to test the robustness of our findings to 
different definitions of innovativeness.  
1. Rogers’ (1962) “Innovators”: We define all console adopters from Rogers’ 
Innovators phase in the product lifecycle, which is defined as the first 2.5% of 
adopters, as innovative consumers. In order to determine the number of consumers 
found in the first 2.5% of all adopters, we find the total market size as of October of 




video game market. We then compute the percentage of the overall installed base for 
console j in week t (IBjt) that is classified as innovative as our measure of Innovjt. 
2. Rogers’ (1962) “Early Adopters”: This specification is identical to the Rogers’ 
(1962) “Innovators” specification proposed above, except that rather than classifying 
only the first 2.5% of adopters as innovative, we consider the first 15% of adopters 
(innovators and early adopters) as innovative. 
3. Chandrasekaran and Tellis’ (2011) Saddle: Conceptually, this specification 
classifies all consumers that adopt prior to the “saddle” as innovative.  The extant 
research shows that, on average, saddles are observed after 30% of the market adopts.  
Thus, we define the first 30% of adopters as innovative consumers. The determination 
of the final market size and the computation of Innovjt after innovative consumers are 
identified are similar to methods (1) and (2) above. 
 4. Gretz and Basuroy’s (2013) “Introduction” Phase: We classify all consumers 
who adopt during the “Introduction” phase, which occurs for at least the first six 
months after product release and until the product experiences a 20% change in the 
monthly moving average of sales, as innovative. Installed base innovativeness is 
found by dividing the number of adopters from this period by the overall size of the 
installed base. 
5. Fixed Four Million: We classify the first four million adopters of a console as 
innovative consumers. We calculate the installed base innovativeness by finding what 





6. Fixed Eight Million: We classify the first eight million adopters of a console as 
innovative consumers. We again calculate the installed base innovativeness by 
finding what percent of the total installed base adopted as one of the first four million 
adopters of a console. 
 To operationalize the recency of an installed base, we need to determine how 
to define “recent” adopters separately from less recent adopters within the end user 
installed. However, prior literature provides limited guidance for how to define 
individual consumers as “recent” within this particular platform product context. As 
such, we define a series of relatively short time windows during which a consumer 
will be considered to have adopted recently. Again, this allows us to test the 
robustness of our findings to different definitions and specifications of recency. 
Specifically, we define five distinct thresholds for characterizing a consumer 
as “recently” adopted using one to five week long time windows. We, therefore, 
calculate how many adopters have adopted the platform in the prior l weeks, in which 
l is the number of weeks for which a console adopter is considered a “recent” adopter. 
We then divide the total number of “recent” adopters by the size of the installed base 
in week t for console j in order to measure installed base recency. 
 
Total Content Sales Results 
 
We first examine how installed base innovativeness and recency impact the 
overall sales of content for a platform system. This model is estimated using ordinary 
least squares with robust standard errors. We report the results for two definitions of 




Basuroy’s (2013) “Introduction” phase, in Table ii. We find that these two thresholds 
provide representative results. Results for all other definitions of installed base 
innovativeness are reported in Appendix A. 
 We find that, regardless of the definition of innovativeness, a more innovative 
installed base results in higher content sales per user. The estimated value of  in 
which  is defined by Rogers’ (1962) “Early Adopter” innovative threshold 
ranges from 1.27-1.43 (p < 0.01), while the estimate for  in which  is 
operationalized by the Gretz and Basuroy (2013) “Introduction” phase threshold 
ranges from 0.96-1.11 (p < 0.01). These results provide support for H1, which is that 
more innovative installed bases purchase more content per user than less innovative 
installed bases.  
 We also find that, regardless of the definition of installed base recency, a more 
recent installed base, in which there is a higher proportion of recent console adopters, 
purchases more content per user than an installed base with lower recency. The 
estimated value of β1 ranges from 8.39 - 41.24 (p < 0.01). These results provide 
support for H2. We also find that the stricter definitions of installed base recency, the 
classifications in which adopters from a shorter period of time before the observation 
week are used to calculate recency, have larger effect sizes than the less strict 
definitions of recency, suggesting that the effect of installed base recency decays 
rapidly. 
Finally, we estimate a significant and negative interaction term between 
installed base innovativeness and recency. The estimated value of β3 ranges from -




H3. In our context, this result suggests that, on an individual level, recent non-
innovative adopters of the platform product purchase a greater amount of their 
content immediately after console purchase, while early adopters continue to 
purchase content well after adoption. On an aggregate level, this finding shows that 
the effect of installed base recency is stronger when an installed base has lower 








Individual Title Sales Analysis 
 
One issue with our results for the effects of installed base innovativeness and 
recency on total content sales is that they do not control for content quality. Since, in 
a platform-mediated market, content quality is a function of the installed base, it is 
possible that the differences in sales could be due to differences in content quality. 
Content sales could, therefore, be due to higher quality content rather than directly 
due to the characteristics of the installed base. 
 To address these potential issues, we estimate a model where the dependent 
variable is content sales at the title-console level.  We include only titles that were 
released on all three consoles, thereby controlling for content quality and its effects 
on console systems while allowing the installed base characteristics of innovativeness 
and recency to vary as content release dates fall on different points of the console 
lifecycle.  
We estimate a model similar to the model with which we tested total content 
sales. The dependent variable for this analysis is the sales of individual games by 
console (titlesalesijt) where i indexes the specific game, j indexes the console, and t 
indexes calendar time. 
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The variables included in this equation match the variables from our total 




fixed effects ( ) to capture for the variance across titles.  Second, we control for the 
number of weeks since the title was released ( ), due to the fact that content 
sales in this market typically diffuse very rapidly over time and exhibit an exponential 
decline that may mask the effects of other factors if we do not control for the title-
specific time dynamics. Specifically, Weekm are a series of indicator variables that 
represent each week after release for the titles in these data.  
 We limit our analysis to only the first ten weeks after the game’s release to 
ensure that our results are not biased by titles released toward the beginning of the 
platform product lifecycle. The sales of these titles are typically characterized by 
many low sales weeks during the later weeks of the platform product lifecycle, at 
which time installed base innovativeness will be low. Given the high proportion of 
sales that occur in the first few weeks after title release, and the importance of these 
weeks for content developers, this limitation is unlikely to bias our results. 
 We report representative results for two definitions of installed base 
innovativeness, based on Rogers’ (1962) Early Adopters (first 15% of sales) and 
adopters during Gretz and Basuroy’s (2013) “Introduction” phase, in Table iii. We 
also provide results for each of the other definitions of innovativeness in Appendix 
B.4  
We again find that installed base innovativeness increases content sales per 
person. β1 ranges from 1.16 to 1.69 (p < 0.01) when innovativeness is defined by 
adoptions during Rogers’ (1962) “Early Adopter” stage and from 1.34 to 1.64 (p < 
0.01) when innovativeness is defined by adoptions during Gretz and Basuroy’s (2013) 
                                                 
4 We do not run this model with the Rogers’ (1962) Innovators operationalization of innovativeness 




“Introduction” phase. More innovative installed bases purchase more copies of the 
specific content titles per installed base member. These results provide further 





 In addition, we find that higher installed base recency leads to higher content 
title sales per installed base member, in support of H2. The estimated value of  β2 
ranges from 6.45 to 19.38 (p < 0.01). The effect size for installed base recency 
declines significantly in many cases between more restrictive and less restrictive 
definitions of recency, suggesting, again, that the effect of installed base recency 
declines rapidly. 
Finally, these results show a significant and negative interaction effect 
between installed base innovativeness and recency on individual content title sales (β3 
ranges from -6.04 to -18.67; p-value < 0.01 for all estimates). These findings provide 
further support for H3, showing that the effect of installed base recency is stronger 
when installed base innovativeness is relatively low, which is often later in the 
platform product’s lifecycle. . 
The results of the individual title analysis, therefore, provide further evidence 
to support our earlier results in the total content sales analysis. Our findings in this 
analysis suggest that those results were not due to potential issues with the content 
firm’s decision making process in relation to content release timing and quality but 




These findings have important implications for both our theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between installed bases and content sales and to 




better understanding of the relationship between installed bases and content sales is 
especially crucial for the entertainment industry going forward, as many forms of 
entertainment are moving to a platform-mediated structure. While we provide our 
results from the video game industry, a sector of the wider entertainment industry that 
has traditionally exhibited a platform-mediated market structure, many additional 
sectors of the entertainment industry, such as the music industry, have recently 
developed this structure. Therefore, as platform-mediated markets become more 
prevalent in new forms of entertainment, managers in the entertainment industry need 
to develop a thorough understanding of the nature of installed bases, the importance 
of their composition between different types of consumers, and how installed bases 
can evolve over time. 
From a theoretical perspective, we show that the likelihood of an installed 
base in a platform-mediated market to purchase content is dynamic based on at least 
two effects, innovativeness and recency, which are both defined by the nature of 
individual consumer adoption timing. It is important to consider these characteristics 
of installed bases, and not just the size of the installed base, when evaluating an 
installed base from the perspective of the content producing firm. 
Our findings suggest that the value of the installed base on a per user basis to 
the content firm, as defined by content sold per installed base member, decreases over 
the platform product’s lifecycle due to declining installed base recency and 
innovativeness. For example, in Figure v, we show how the predicted content 
purchases per member of the installed base changes over the lifecycle of the 




definition of recency. This graph shows a substantial decrease in the content 
purchasing behavior of the members of an installed base over the platform’s lifecycle. 
Figure v: Predicted Content Sales per Installed Base Member 
 
In contrast, a model that predicts total content sales using only the control 
variables from our models and the overall size of the installed base, as defined by the 
total number of prior console adopters, finds an increase in the predicted content sales 
over the platform product’s lifecycle (Figure vi). 





These findings, therefore, show conflicting evidence as to how purchasing 
behavior will evolve during the platform product’s lifecycle. While installed base 
size, which serves as a measure of potential market size for content in a platform-
mediated market, increases over the platform product’s lifecycle and thus increases 
predicted content sales, the likelihood of content purchase for each member of that 
installed base decreases over time, somewhat ameliorating the effects of installed 
base size. Therefore, our results show why it is necessary to evaluate installed bases 
at a deeper level than just examining the impact of installed base size.  
 These findings also offer important insights for managers in platform-
mediated markets. Specifically, our results help inform managers in their content 
release timing decisions. Content firms need to consider the dynamic components of 
installed base recency and innovativeness when releasing content. The evaluation of 
how likely each member of an installed base is to purchase content could result in 
firms making the decision to release content earlier in the platform lifecycle. 
Specifically, the firm could try to take advantage of higher installed base 
innovativeness and recency rather than waiting for a larger installed base size. 
 For managers in platform firms, these results provide important knowledge 
about the nature of installed bases. Specifically, our findings further inform these 
firms about the relationship between end users and content providers. Platform firms 
often subsidize one side of their market to develop a large installed base that can be 
used to help sell the platform to the other side of the market (Parker and Van Alstyne 
2005). Given that the size of the installed base does not appear to be the only 




platform-mediated market, platform firms should consider how to appropriately 
attract consumers who might purchase more content to the platform system. Within 
our results, this means that platform firms should heavily subsidize “innovative” users 
to ensure as many of these users as possible in the platform system. 
 While these findings provide important insights on both a theoretical and 
managerial level, they also provide an opportunity for further research. While we 
study two sources of installed base dynamics, innovativeness and recency, other 
characteristics of an installed base could also impact the amount of content purchased 
per user in an installed base. Further study is needed to theoretically establish and 
empirically test these potential effects.  
 Future research could also further study how the dynamic nature of installed 
bases might result in differences in installed base preferences for certain types of 
content. In the video game context used in this research, it is possible that installed 
base innovativeness and recency is related to demand for different genres of games. 
For example, an installed base high in recency but lower in innovativeness might 
comparatively demand more children’s games, while a highly innovative installed 
base might prefer more sports games. A better understanding of the relationships 
between installed base recency and innovativeness and genres of content will provide 







We show that installed bases in platform-mediated markets display dynamic 
characteristics that affect content purchasing behavior. We find that more innovative 
installed bases purchase more content per person than less innovative installed bases. 
Our results also show that higher recency installed bases, which on average adopted 
the platform product more recently, purchase more content than installed bases with a 
lower recency. Finally, our results show a significant interaction effect between 
installed base innovativeness and recency, suggesting that the effect of installed base 
recency on content sales is larger for installed bases with lower innovativeness. 
These results are crucially important for managers of content firms in 
platform-mediated markets. This is a common and expanding market structure within 
many entertainment industries, where content is now often distributed through 
platform products. As platform markets expand further in the entertainment industry, 
it will be crucial to better understand how installed bases purchase content. These 
results provide insights for content managers in their content release timing decisions. 
Specifically, managers need to consider installed base innovativeness and recency in 














The extant literature on the effectiveness of promotional communications has 
been characterized by a divide in how these promotional communications are 
measured to evaluate their effects. One set of research, which examines the impact of 
advertising, the most commonly studied form of paid promotional communication, on 
consumer behavior or firm outcomes such as sales or profits, has developed with a 
rich set of measures. This literature has specifically examined a variety of different 
drivers of advertising effectiveness, including exposures (Batra and Ray 1986, 
Pechmann and Stewart 1988, and Tellis 1988), creative characteristics (Till and 
Baack 2005, Dahlen et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2008, and Bertrand et al. 2010), targeting 
(Esteban et al. 2003, Iyer et al. 2005, Bergemann and Bonatti 2011, and Goldfarb and 
Tucker 2011), and fit with the product (Kamins and Gupta 1994, McDaniel 1999, and 
Till and Busler 2000). Another stream of research examines the impact of 
promotional communications, typically advertising, on firm financial performance 
(Erickson and Jacobson 1992, Conchar et al. 2005, Singh et al. 2005, McAlister et al. 
2007, Srinivasan et al. 2009, Joshi and Hanssens 2010, and Luo and de Jong 2012). 
This research has exclusively measured the effect of these promotions using the 
aggregate expenditures on adevertising at the firm level.  
There are two primary reasons for the divergent use of predictor variables in 




desired managerial implications. Research focused on the financial effect of 
advertising often seeks to determine the effect of firm marketing allocation decisions 
on firm financial performance. Advertising spending is the most appropriate 
independent variable for evaluating this research question. In contrast, the wider 
advertising effectiveness literature has developed with a wider variety of research 
goals, such as linking different advertising measures and components to either firm 
outcomes, like sales, or to consumer behaviors or attitudes, including purchasing 
behavior or brand preference. This set of varied goals requires varied measures of 
advertising. 
In addition to the theoretical differences between these two literatures, the use 
of spending as a predictor variable serves a practical purpose in the estimation of the 
effects of paid promotional communications on firm financial performance. The 
aggregate nature of studying these marketing communications at a firm level 
neccesssitates either the simultaneous analysis of many variables that each could 
impact the effectiveness of the marketing communication or, alternatively, the use of 
a single proxy that theoretically should capture all of these effects. Therefore, prior 
research on the topic of the financial effects of advertising uses advertising spending 
as an implicit proxy for the overall effect of advertising on the firm, based on the link 
between expenditures and a variety of other measures of advertising, including 
exposures, creative elements, and appropriate targetting.  
However, we ask whether spending is actually an appropriate proxy for the 
total effect of paid promotional communications. In considering this question, we first 




capture the total effect of paid marketing communications. In the 2012 Presidential 
campaign, both the Barack Obama and Mitt Romney campaigns purchased a 
television advertisement for the same “daypart,” that is to say the same time, day, 
program, and television channel. Both campaigns purchased a 30-second 
advertisement placed on “Wheel of Fortune” in Columbus, Ohio. However, due to a 
variety of factors in how the advertisements were purchased, the Obama campaign 
only paid $500 for this advertisement, while the Romney campaign paid $2,800 for 
their advertisement. If we were to perform an econometric analysis in which we use 
advertising spending as a proxy for the overall effect of advertising, the model would 
predict that the advertising for Romney’s campaign would have more of an impact 
than the Obama campaign’s advertisement. However, setting aside the creative 
component of advertising, a prediction that Romney’s campaign would receive 
significantly more of an effect from what was essentially the same exposure seems 
unlikely.  
Generalizing this example, the extant literature has found that this imperfect 
link between advertising exposures and expenditures exists across advertisers, with a 
correlation between exposures and expenditures of between 0.39 and 0.62 (Chang and 
Kinnucan 1992; Chung and Kaiser 1999). These findings suggests that we need to 
examine other measures of paid marketing communications in  econometric models 
in order to test the overall financial effect of these communications. 
We, therefore, begin to bridge the gap between the literature studying the 
financial effect of paid promotional communications and the wider marketing 




exposures and expenditures on firm financial performance. This is a challenge in 
most contexts, such as in most advertising contexts, due to the direct tie between 
spending and exposures, in which exposures are directly purchased by the firm, 
resulting in the continued relationship, however imperfect, between exposures and 
expenditures. We, therefore, seek a context in which exposures occur outside of the 
direct control of the firm. While unusual within an advertising context, this will allow 
the independent estimation of exposures and expenditures, providing a better 
understanding of how marketing communications affect a firm's financial 
performance. We also seek a context in which some of the other drivers of the 
effectiveness of these communications, such as creative elements, are relatively less 
important in order to more thoroughly isolate the effects of exposures and 
expenditures. 
The context we use in this study is stadium naming rights. Stadium naming 
rights agreements are sponsorship agreements in which firms get to name sports 
venues after one of their brands or the firm itself. The goal of these agreements is to 
generate media mentions of the firm, which are indirectly purchased through the 
purchase of the stadium’s name. Specifically, every time the stadium is mentioned in 
a media source, the firm or brand's name is also mentioned. These mentions serve as 
exposures in this context. Firms pay for this sponsorship agreement with a set fee 
established at the signing of the naming rights agreement. This fee does not vary with 
the number of mentions the firm actually receives. The expenditures are, therefore, 
independent of the actual media mentions of the stadium and firm/brand name. In 




relatively clean test of the effect of exposures, mostly separated from other drivers of 
communication effectiveness, such as creative capability. 
This unique context, which allows for the study of how financial markets react 
to media exposures, serves, from a theoretical perspective, as a transitional form of 
communication between advertising and earned media or publicity. Eisend and 
Küster (2011) define advertising as “paid communication that identifies the message 
sponsor” while defining publicity as “communication that secures editorial space in 
media for promotion purposes and does not have an identifiable sponsor.” Stadium 
naming rights agreements provide exposures through editoral space in media. This 
would suggest that advertising could be considered publicity, as the firm seeks 
exposures in a media source that is not directly controlled by the firm. However, the 
sponsor is clearly identified in these exposures, as the firm or brand name is the basis 
of the exposure itself. Therefore, while stadium naming rights as a form of 
sponsorship may not qualify directly as advertising, the unique nature of this form of 
marketing communication is such that our results may have implications for how 
advertising can impact a firm’s financial performance. 
Using this unique context, we study how media exposures can affect a firm's 
stock returns and systematic risk. The extant literature has found relatively 
heterogeneous results for the effects of advertising on firm stock returns (Erickson 
and Jacobson 1992, Conchar et al. 2005, Srinivasan et al. 2009, Joshi and Hanssens 
2010, and Luo and de Jong 2012). These results suggest that firm marketing 
communications might have a small and positive effect on firm stock price, but that 




total effect of the communications. In contrast, prior models have consistently shown 
that increases in advertising spending lower a firm's systematic risk (Singh et al. 
2005; McAlister et al. 2007). However, these models have been unable to 
demonstrate the mechanism by which this form of marketing communication lowers 
systematic risk. Prior theory suggests that this effect could occur either due to the 
expanding of the consumer base through increased marketing communications or 
through signaling that a firm is safer due to an increase in marketing spending. By 
separating exposures from expenditures, while limiting the effects of other 
components of the marketing communication, we seek to better understand one 
mechanism by which paid promotional communications affect financial performance.  
Based on the nature of stock return measurement as established by the extant 
asset pricing literature, we conduct two separate analyses to evaluate the effects of 
exposures and expenditures on stock returns. The use of separate tests is necessitated 
by the temporal nature of this context. Prior financial theory has suggested that stock 
markets only react to new information. The stadium naming rights context is 
characterized by a variable number of exposures over time and a fixed expenditure, 
announced at the beginning of the agreement. The temporal nature of this context 
allows us to independently identify the effects of expenditures and exposures. 
However, it does necessitate the use of two separate analyses, each uniquely designed 
to capture the effects of these two measures on stock returns over their unique time 
windows. 
We design a stock market return model to capture the effect of unexpected 




naming rights expenditures due to the aforementioned temporal nature of these 
expenditures in this context, in which the expenditures have been announced prior to 
the measurement of the media exposures on a monthly basis over the length of the 
naming rights agreement. Therefore, theoretically, the stock market should fully 
account for the effect of stadium naming rights expenditures by the time of exposure 
observation.  
Next, due to the nature of stadium naming rights expenditures, which are 
announced upon agreement signing, we conduct an event study based on the signing 
of new stadium naming rights agreements. This analysis will first inform us if 
financial markets on average reward the firm for signing a naming rights agreement. 
More importantly for our research question, we can then use the individual lifts in 
stock prices for each firm as a dependent variable in a model that determines whether 
other variables, including stadium naming rights expenditures, affect the stock market 
reaction to newly signed stadium naming rights agreements. 
Finally, we test the effect that expenditures and exposures have on firm 
systematic risk. Unlike in our analyses for stock returns, we can measure the effects 
of both spending and exposures on systematic risk over time in our stadium naming 
rights agreement context. We test the annual effect of both variables on systematic 
risk using a variety of different specifications representing differing sets of modeling 
assumptions.  
The monthly stock returns model provides evidence that unexpected media 
exposures increase firm stock returns, suggesting that the financial markets reward 




a variety of other drivers of the effect of marketing communications. Expenditures are 
controlled by the temportal nature of stadium naming rights agreements. In addition, 
the randomness of exposures, lack of firm influence over when the exposures occur, 
and the relatively shallow nature of this form of promotion, in which only the brand 
or firm name is mentioned, control for firm strategy and the creative quality of the 
promotion. These controls lead to an evaluation of exposures that is relatively isolated 
from other relevant effects. We also show that additional exposures lead to lower firm 
systematic risk, when controlling for the effects of expenditures, regardless of the 
modeling assumptions and specification. These results suggest that financial markets 
react positively to increased exposures controlling for these other drivers of the 
effectiveness of marketing communications. 
Our second analysis provides evidence that, holding other factors of 
marketing effectiveness constant, agreements with higher expenditures result in 
decreased stock returns relative to lower cost agreements. In the systematic risk 
model, we find inconsistent evidence that suggests that expenditures might increase 
firm systematic risks, holding media exposures constant. This set of results for 
expenditures suggests that financial markets react negatively to higher cost 
agreements by lowering stock returns and by potentially increasing firm risk. 
These results underline the importance of considering additional measures 
when attempting to estimate the overall effect of promotional communications, such 
as advertising, on firm financial performance. Specifically, we find that 
independently identifying the effects of exposures and expenditures in a sponsorship 




campaign. While exposures improve firm financial performance, expenditures have 
potentially detrimental effects on financial performance. As such, our analysis 
suggests that in order to gain a richer understanding of the often studied link between 
paid marketing communications and firm financial performance, researchers should 
consider how to identify different measures and components of this communication in 
a manner that is independent from spending. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first review the prior literature on the 
financial impact of marketing in general and marketing communications, primarily 
advertising, specifically. We then describe our data and present each of our analyses 
and their findings. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our 
findings. 
 
Asset Pricing Models in Marketing Contexts 
 
We use asset pricing models to study how media exposures and associated 
promotional expenditures affect firm performance in a stadium naming rights context. 
A variety of research has tied marketing activities to firm stock market performance 
using asset pricing theory. For example, the extant literature has examined the effects 
of product quality (Aaker and Jacobson 1994), brand attitude (Aaker and Jacobson 
2001), marketing strategy (Mizik and Jacobson 2003), product innovations 
(Srinivasan et al. 2009), and aggregate advertising expenditures (Erickson and 
Jacobson 1992, Joshi and Hanssens 2010, Srinivasan et al. 2009, and McAlister et. al 




The advantage of this approach compared with other performance metrics, 
such as firm sales or profits, is the long time horizon of financial metrics. A firm’s 
stock price, theoretically, is the present value of all future cash flows for the firm. 
Many firm performance metrics, such as profitability and sales, are limited in the 
scope of their analysis. These metrics restrict our ability to judge the effectiveness of 
a marketing strategy for the firm, since marketing programs are often designed to 
improve firm sales and profits over the long-term.  
Given the long-term nature of the effect of advertising investments, in which 
firms invest in advertising that often does not lead to immediate sales or profits, prior 
research has extensively analyzed the effect of advertising expenditures on firm 
financial performance (Erickson and Jacobson 1992, Conchar et al. 2005, Singh et al. 
2005, McAlister et al. 2007, Srinivasan et al. 2009, Joshi and Hanssens 2010, and Luo 
and de Jong 2012). Erickson and Jacobson (1992) find that by controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, advertising expenditures result in limited additional stock 
returns for the firm. This result refutes earlier findings, which had not accounted for 
unobserved variables and had shown positive financial effects from investments in 
advertising (Connolly and Hirschey 1984). Erickson and Jacobson (1992) also 
determine that spending on advertising was not necessarily viewed favorably by the 
markets but was rather seen as an expense that reduced firm profitability. In contrast, 
Srinivasan et al. (2009) and Joshi and Hanssens (2010) find that markets react well 
(through increased firm stock returns) to advertising support for a firm’s products and 
towards advertising expenditures in general. A meta-analysis of this literature 




shown some positive effect of advertising expenditures on firm value, this effect is 
very sensitive to how firm value changes are modeled. Effect sizes in this literature 
have a relatively high variation depending on modeling assumptions. This may 
potentially be due to the inability to separate the effects of advertising expenditures 
from that of advertising exposures. Since the correlation between these two drivers of 
advertising’s financial effect would be expected to vary across contexts, the use of 
aggregate advertising spending as a proxy for the overall effect of advertising may 
explain the heterogeneous results reported in the literature. 
In contrast to these varying findings on the effect of advertising on firm stock 
returns, prior research suggests a more definitive relationship between firm 
advertising spending and risk. Specifically, the extant literature suggests that 
advertising lowers firm systematic risk (Singh et al. 2005 and McAlister et al. 2007), 
which is a measure of the firm’s exposure to changes in the overall returns of the 
stock market. Firms seek to lower their systematic risk in order to lower their cost of 
capital (Lubatkin and O’Neill 1987). A lower cost of capital allows the firm to engage 
in additional investments which have a positive net present value (NPV) that 
previously would have had a lower, and potentially negative, NPV. In addition, firm-
specific assets, such as employees, are cheaper to acquire for firms with lower risk, 
holding other factors constant (Lim and Wang 2007). This literature, therefore, finds 
that lower risk results in financial benefits for the firm, specifically by potentially 





We expand on these previous findings by examining the disparate effects of 
media exposures and their associated expenditures in a stadium naming rights context 
on firm financial performance. While our context differs from traditional advertising 
contexts in the fact that the firm does not pay the publication medium directly for the 
exposure, enough similarities exist to suggest that promotion in this context will be 
similar to promotion in an advertising context, as the firm purchases the right to 
promotional content in which the sponsor is identified in each context. As such, we 
expand on the prior literature studying the effect of advertising on firm financial 
performance. Specifically, we provide results suggesting how different components of 
marketing communications impact the firm’s stock returns and systematic risk. These 
results provide a richer understanding of the relationship between paid promotional 





The context for our study is stadium naming rights agreements, which is a 
form of paid promotion through corporate sponsorship. The firm agrees to pay a 
certain amount per year for a stadium naming rights agreement, regardless of the 
number of exposures of the firm’s name. Rather than the traditional tie between 
expenditures and exposures, this results in the firm paying a flat rate for what is 
effectively a random set of exposures. These agreements often range in length from 
10-25 years. Firms typically announce the total expenditures and contract length as 




certainty with respect to the agreement’s parameters. However, the actual number of 
exposures on a monthly level contain a random component that can’t be completely 
predicted by either the firm or the financial markets. 
In Figure vii, we plot exposures versus expenditures in the stadium naming 
rights context. The lack of a clear relationship is obvious. This figure shows that this 
form of sponsorship is a natural platform in which to separately study the effects of 
media exposures and associated expenditures, as the correlation between expenditures 
and exposures is only 0.10 in this context. 
Figure vii: Predicted and Observed Mentions and Expenditures5 
 
Our dataset consists of naming rights agreements for stadiums with sports 
franchise tenants competing in the major sports leagues in the United States and 
Canada: the National Football League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), the 
                                                 




National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL), Major 
League Soccer (MLS), and major college football (Division I Bowl Subdivision) and 
college basketball (Division I). Each stadium has at least one sports organization from 
one of these leagues as a tenant. We only analyze stadium naming rights agreements 
involving public firms, due to our use of stock market data. In addition, inclusion of a 
stadium naming rights agreement in the dataset is determined by the release of 
information on the firm’s expenditure and the length of the contract for the stadium 
naming rights agreement.  
We collect data on the number of media exposures for each stadium from the 
News Library database (http://nl.newsbank.com). This database contains media 
articles from 4,597 publications across the United States. Exposures are defined as the 
number of articles that mention the complete stadium name. The inclusion of only 
complete stadium names ensures that we do not capture extraneous brand mentions in 
the media sources. For example, we only collect mentions of “Bank of America 
Stadium” so as not to include unconnected business articles discussing Bank of 
America’s finances, allowing us to isolate the effects of this specific form of 
marketing communications. These data are collected at the monthly level. 
In order to ensure that our results are not due to issues with the composition of 
the database, which does not contain a complete census of media sources, we 
augment our dataset for any metropolitan areas in which the largest daily newspaper 
was not included in this dataset. Major local daily newspapers have a disproportionate 
impact on the total number of media mentions for a stadium, necessitating that each 




data were collected from either the Factiva database, when the local major daily 
newspaper was available, or from the website of the newspaper itself, when the major 
newspaper was unavailable in both databases.6  
Each of our three analyses requires a distinct dataset with different included 
variables, time windows, and requirements for the calculation of firm financial 
performance. As such, we provide a more detailed description of the dataset used for 
each analysis while outlining each methodology. 
 
Effect of Media Exposures on Firm Stock Returns 
 
We build our model on extant asset pricing theory, which is based on the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964 and Lintner 1965). This model 
specifies a firm’s returns adjusted for the returns of risk-free assets based on several 
components: market returns, the returns of a risk-free asset, a firm’s idiosyncratic 
risk, and the firm’s estimated systematic risk. The CAPM captures the relationship 
between market returns and firm stock returns. Other researchers (Fama and French 
1993 and Carhart 1997) have augmented this model with effects that account for firm 
size (SMB), book-to-market ratio (HML), and momentum (UMD), forming the “four-
factor model” (1). 























                                                 





As is standard in this form of analysis, our dependent variable is formed by 
subtracting the risk free asset return rate at time t (Rrft) from firm i’s stock returns at 
time t (Rit). The firm’s systematic risk is the coefficient (β1) describing the effect of 
market returns (Rmt), adjusted for the risk free return rate, on firm stock returns. The 
CAPM states that in order to increase the predicted stock returns on a portfolio of 
assets, an investor must increase the systematic (or non-diversifiable) risk of the 
portfolio. Firms with a higher systematic risk are more sensitive to macroeconomic 
shocks than firms with a comparatively lower systematic risk. The remaining 
coefficients control for whether the firm tends to change in value similarly to smaller 
or larger firms (β2), high or low book-to-market firms (β3), and firms that previously 
increased in value or those that previously decreased in value (β4). This model also 
includes an intercept (α) which captures any structural differences between a 
portfolio or firm’s return and the market’s return. The error term captures what is 
often called a firm’s idiosyncratic risk. This model is a standard, accepted 
methodology for studying the effect of marketing on firm financial performance 
(Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). 
For this analysis, we use a panel of 49 stadium naming rights agreements from 
2001-2010, collected at the monthly level. The agreements and time windows for 
each agreement were selected based upon the focal firm’s status as a public firm that 
reports advertising expenditures, the expenditures on the stadium naming rights 
agreement, and the time period in which the agreement remains active. These data 




for dividends and any changes in the number of shares outstanding, using data from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  
In order to test the effect of media exposures, we extend the four-factor model 
(1) to include lagged media exposures adjusted for the number of events in the 
stadium in the observation month and controls for observed firm characteristics (2). 
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This approach – including as an additional regressor our variable of interest – 
is a standard method for testing the effect of firm activities on stock returns, 
conditional on the characteristics of the overall financial market. The values for the 
four market-level factors are collected from Kenneth French’s Data Library.7 The 
variable Totalmediaexposures is the (lagged) number of media exposures for each 
month t for stadium i.  
As all sports franchises operate on predictable event schedules, in which each 
sport is “in season” (holding events/games) during a specific period of time, it is also 
crucial to control for the seasonality and market expectations of media exposures. 
However, traditional controls for seasonality, such as indicator variables for each 
month, are inappropriate here as each stadium will experience seasonality in a 
different manner depending on the sports played in the stadium. For example, Safeco 
Field, the baseball stadium in Seattle, is active between the months of April and 
October, while CenturyLink Field, the football stadium in Seattle, is active between 
                                                 





the months of August and January. In addition, even within a season, certain months 
will be more active than other months, based upon both a random component of 
scheduling and differences within seasons for each sport. For example, in November 
2011, the Seattle Seahawks played 4 games, while they only played 3 games in 
November 2012. As schedules are announced well prior to the start of the active 
“season,” this seasonality is already accounted in the market expectation for the 
number of media mentions. More active months will have higher market expectations 
for exposures, necessitating the use of a control for the number of games played by 
the tenants of a stadium in each month.  
The unique nature of seasonality in this context necessitates the use of a 
unique control for market expectation. We control for market expectations based on 
seasonality by dividing the total number of media exposures by the total games 
played by all sports franchise tenants of that stadium in the observation month.8 More 
traditional methods for determining market expectations, such as the use of a simple 
autoregressive model, are inappropriate in this case. Specifically, an autoregressive 
model, which sets market expectations based on the prior month would not account 
for the stadium specific seasonality issues.9 
We include descriptive statistics and correlations for each of the variables 
studied within our model in Tables iv and v. 
 
 
                                                 
8 We add 1 to this total due to the prevalence of months without events within our data. 
9 We do test the robustness of our results to alternative specifications of market expectations, including the use 
of a model in which monthly exposure expectations are a function of total events in a month and the number of 
exposures in the same month 1 year prior to the observation month. Our results are robust to this specification 






Table iv: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table v: Correlations 
 
In estimating Model (2), we also include agreement-level fixed effects to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. It’s worth noting that the inclusion of these 
variables is contrary to finance theory, which suggests that, after controlling for the 
four-factors, firms should not systematically demonstrate differences in α, which 
would be captured by fixed effects. However, in our context, these fixed effects are 
crucial to control for time-invariant, agreement-level effects. Notably, these effects 
provide controls for market expectations for per-game exposures based on between-
stadium differences, other promotional components of stadium naming rights 
agreements (e.g. signage), and time-invariant sports franchise and metropolitan area 




expected media exposures from the effects of random and unexpected brand 
exposures. Due to this potential conflict between financial theory and our approach, 
we estimate this model both with and without the fixed effects included to evaluate 
the robustness of our results. 
A Breusch-Pagan test on (2) indicates significant heteroskedasticity at the 
stadium naming rights agreement level. Thus, we estimate these models using 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS),10 which is more efficient than Maximum 
Likelihood estimation with robust standard errors in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity (Carroll and Ruppert 1982). We estimate this model with a 
heteroskedastic error structure for each of the models. Table vi presents our main 
results. 
Table vi: FGLS Results 
 
                                                 
10 FGLS estimators are asymptotically efficient and represent the minimum variance linear unbiased estimator in 




As shown in Model specifications (3) and (4), we find that total media 
exposures per event is significantly and positively related to firm stock returns at the 
95% level.11 Moreover, our results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of fixed 
effects in the model. These results imply that financial markets react to an increase in 
exposures directly rather than simply reacting to expenditures, a correlated variable 
that has been the proxy used in prior analyses of the effect of paid marketing 
communications on firm value.  
One concern in our results is that they could be due to the time window in 
which the observations were taken (2001-2010) and the inclusion of many firms in 
the financial industry. Specifically, this time period includes a major recession in the 
United States that heavily impacted the financial sector. We test the robustness of our 
results to the inclusion of indicator variables for financial firms and whether the 
observation month occurs in the years 2008-2009. We find that our results are robust 
to the inclusion of these terms, suggesting that our results are neither driven by 
industry- or time-specific concerns in relation to the macroeconomic environment. 
 
Effect of Promotional Expenditures on Firm Stock Returns 
 
In Model (2), we find a positive effect of exposures on firm stock returns, 
holding constant the expenditures based on the nature of stock returns models. 
Expenditures are announced at agreement signing, which occurs prior to the 
realization of these media exposures. Therefore, we need to analyze the effect of 
                                                 
11 In order to ensure that our results are not due to influential datapoints, we also run this analysis eliminating all 
points found to be influential through high Cook’s Distance values. Our results are robust to the elimination of 




expenditures using a model designed to capture the stock market’s reaction to the 
initial signing of the naming rights agreement.  
A positive relationship between promotional expenditures and returns could 
occur either directly, in which spending serves as a signal of firm quality to the 
financial market, or indirectly by signaling product quality to consumers (Nelson 
1974, Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984, and Milgrom and Roberts 1986) and increasing 
firm sales. However, prior research has also suggested that financial markets might 
punish firms for promotional expenditures that do not yield sufficient short-term ROI 
(Erickson and Jacobson 1992). Therefore, while we have shown that some of the 
positive financial effects within a sponsorship context are driven by the effect of 
exposures, the extant literature suggests that we could see either a positive or negative 
effect of the associated expenditures, conditional on the number of exposures 
expected by the financial markets. 
Due to the temporal nature of the stadium naming rights context, in which 
expenditures are time-invariant and announced at agreement signing, we analyze the 
stock price impact of promotional expenditures using an event study. The focal event 
for this event study is the signing of the stadium naming rights agreement. This 
methodology will allow us to analyze the impact of expenditures while controlling for 
the market’s expectations for exposures. 
We employ a cumulative abnormal returns model (CAR), a common financial 
event study methodology previously employed in a marketing context by Gielens et 
al. (2008). This approach compares the firm’s observed stock returns, which includs 




between observed and expected returns without the event is an estimate of the effect 
of the event. The use of cumulative abnormal returns is the preferred method for 
identifying the impact on firm stock price of a discrete event over a short time 
horizon (Gielens et al. 2008; Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). 
We collect daily stock returns data for 89 firms with stadium naming rights 
agreements from CRSP. These data consist of all agreements signed by public firms 
with an announced expenditure and agreement length for the focal major sports 
leagues. We divide the data into two time windows relative to the agreement 
announcement date (the “event date”). The first window consists of financial data for 
each of the firms for approximately 4 weeks before and after the event date. This is 
henceforth referred to as the “event window.” The second data window runs for 
approximately 35 weeks prior to the beginning of the “event window.” This window 
is used to establish a financial baseline by estimating firm-specific coefficients for 
each of our firms, and is thus referred to as the “estimation window.” 
In order to establish these baseline financial coefficients for each firm, we 
estimate a series of firm-specific Capital Asset Pricing Models (CAPM) using OLS 
(3).12 This set of analyses is conducted on the data from the estimation window. 














In this equation, we use the firm’s returns (Ri), the risk-free asset return (Rrf), 
and the market return (Rm) on estimation window day τ to estimate a firm-specific 
value for α, which captures structural differences between firm and market returns, 
                                                 
12 We use a CAPM instead of a Four-Factor Model in keeping with the Patell (1976) adjustment, which is 




and β1i, which is the firm’s sensitivity to changes in market returns (also known as 
systematic risk). 
Each firm’s baseline characteristics are then used to define an expected return 
value for each firm on each day within the “event window” (4). This expected return 
value is the counterfactual stock return that would be expected to exist in the absence 
of the event on each day t during the “event window.” 














Following the standard CAR event study approach, we subtract the expected 
stock returns for each day in the event window from the observed firm stock returns 
on that day. The difference between the observed and expected stock returns is used 
as an estimate of the financial market reaction to the event (the signing of the naming 
rights agreement). We classify each day in the event window by their relationship to 
the event date for the appropriate firm. For example, for each firm, the day before the 
announcement of the naming rights agreement is classified as Day -1, while the day 
after the announcement is classified as Day 1. This results in 89 observations for each 
day relative to the event date within the event window. 
The difference between the predicted and observed stock returns is adjusted 
according to the procedure proposed by Patell (1976). This adjustment is commonly 
used within the finance event-study literature (see, e.g., Brown and Warner 1985, 
Seiler 2000, Gielens et al. 2008, and Corrado 2011) and serves two purposes. First, it 
accounts for differences in variance between observed and expected stock returns due 
to the use of a separate estimation dataset, which, theoretically, could increase 




windows. This method also mitigates the influence of particularly high-variance 
observations in the calculation of aggregated stock returns due to the event. The 
adjustment, therefore, helps ensure that our results are not simply driven by a small 
number of agreements but rather due to changes seen across the broader set of firms 
within our database. 
In order to perform this adjustment on the raw returns, we first calculate a 
measure designated as C
it
, which accounts for the increase in variance due to the use 
of a separate estimation dataset outside of the estimation period (5). This term is 
specific for each firm i and each day within the event window t. All notation matches 
Patell (1976). 
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In this equation, T is equal to the number of days in the estimation period, Rmt 
is the return of the market at time t during the event window, Rmτ is the return of the 
market at time τ during the estimation window, and  @+  is the mean of market returns 
during the estimation period as defined by Equation 6. 
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We also calculate the variance during the estimation window and the 
corresponding predicted values of the firm-specific CAPM (7). 




Finally, we adjust the firm’s stock returns using each of these terms (8). In this 




examination. For example, if we want to find the returns of the firm over the day of 
the event and the day immediately before the event, L would be equal to two. 
Expected returns are calculated as in (6), in which each coefficient is estimated by the 
firm-specific estimation of the CAPM using the estimation dataset. 
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We use the adjusted returns from this equation to empirically estimate both 
the length and valence of the event’s impact on firm financial performance. This 
empirical estimation ensures that we accurately account for both “leakage,” which is 
the dissemination of information on the event prior to the official announcement, and 
for potential issues with slow dissemination of information after the event has been 
officially announced. The amount of leakage and the speed of information 
dissemination are typically handled empirically for financial event studies (Gielens et 
al. 2008). 
We do not find a period in which there is a significant lift in firm stock returns 
due to the implementation of a new stadium naming rights agreement, using a Z-
Statistic methodology proposed by Patell (1976).13 The relatively small size of market 
reaction to the overall naming rights agreement suggests an important result. As these 
agreements are negotiated between a seller (typically the sports franchise or a local 
municipality) and a buyer (the advertiser), the negotiations produce efficient results. 
The seller is able to extract enough from the buyer that they do not, on average, gain 
excess stock returns due to the signing of the agreement. While interesting, the goal 
                                                 
13 The Z-score for the two-day window is approximately 0.01, which is the highest value for any tested window, 




of this research is not to determine the average impact of a naming rights agreement 
on the firm’s stock returns. We seek to determine whether expenditures, which 
potentially moderate the effect of the event on stock market returns, have a significant 
effect on the stock price lift experienced by the firm due to the signing of the 
agreement. We, therefore, need to select a window in which to analyze moderating 
variables that might affect the lift a stock receives based on the report of a stadium 
naming rights agreement. 
The signing of naming rights agreements are often accompanied by press 
conferences involving sports franchise representatives, municipal leaders, and C-suite 
executives from the firm. Based on this characteristic of the event, we theorize that 
there is likely a small amount of information leakage prior to the announcement due 
to the pre-announcement of this press conference. The high visibility of the event 
should theoretically result in rapid information dissemination to the financial markets 
that the agreement has been signed on the day of the anouncement of the agreement. 
Therefore, we select a 2-day window, defined as the day before the public 
announcement and the day of the public announcement, for analysis.14 
We estimate a regression model to test the impact of annual expenditures on 
the stock market returns due to the naming rights agreement signing (9). We use 
Adjretlit as the dependent variable in our analysis. Adjretlit represents the change in 
firm i’s returns due to the event compared to expected firm returns without the event 
over window l. Using this measure, we test the moderating effect of a variety of 
variables on the lift in firm returns caused by the event. This methodology is 
                                                 




consistent with Gielens et al. (2008), who tested the effects of moderating variables 
on the stock market lift due to a discrete event. 
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We estimate this model including a variety of control variables (Xim). First, 
we control for expected exposures. This measure is calculated by finding the total 
number of media exposures for the stadium’s sports franchise tenants in the year prior 
to the beginning of the event dataset. This control ensures that our estimates for the 
effect of expenditures is independent of the market’s expectations for exposures that 
will be accounted for by the financial markets at the signing of the naming rights 
agreement.  
In our full model, we account for a variety of other variables that could impact 
how the firm’s stock price reacts to the signing of the naming rights agreement. We 
include controls for the population of the metropolitan area and the growth of the 
metropolitan area. These data are collected from the Texas A&M Real Estate Center 
population database (http://recenter.tamu.edu/data/pop/) and from the Canadian 
census. The population of the metropolitan area is likely related with positive affect 
for the affiliated sports franchise and with the overall influence of the franchise. We 
also include controls for whether or not the stadium is located in New York City, 
which allows us to capture any non-linear effects for the purchase of stadium naming 
rights in the largest market in our dataset. Finally, we include a variety of other 
control variables, including whether the stadium is located in the same metropolitan 




percentage of the tenant sports organization, total attendance for the teams in the prior 
season, and indicator variables for expansion or college teams. These data are 
collected from a variety of online datasets.15 Summary statistics for each of these 
variables are found in Table vii. We also provide correlations for each of these 
variables (Table viii). 
Table vii: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table viii: Correlations 
 
These correlations suggest that expenditures, expected exposures, 
metropolitan area population, and annual attendance are potentially related variables. 
Therefore, it is important to ensure that our results for the effect of expenditures on 
firm stock returns are robust to the inclusion of these variables in the analysis. 
We estimate three models for the two-day event windows: a model without 
any of the control variables, a model including only the expected media exposures 
control variable, and a model with the full set of control variables. All of our models 
                                                 
15 Most records were found from the online sports-reference database (http://www.sports-reference.com/) and 





are estimated using Maximum Likelihood with a sample of 89 stadium naming rights 
agreements (Table ix). 
Table ix: Stock Market Reaction to Expenditures 
 
Additional expenditures on stadium naming rights have a significant negative 
effect on stock returns following the announcement of the agreement. This effect is 




to the model. This result suggests that additional expenditures lead to lower stock 
returns upon stock market announcement of the naming rights agreement.16 
Only one of the other included variables, the growth of the city’s population, 
has a significant effect on the lift caused by the signing of the naming rights 
agreement, suggesting that most variables are captured efficiently in the negotiation 
between the naming rights firm and stadium owners, leading to a lack of excess 
returns for the naming rights firm.  
Due to the lack of significance for many of the other included variables, the 
more parsimonious models perform better than the model containing all of the control 
variables according to both AIC and BIC measures. Combined, then, the results of 
this section and the previous section suggest that financial markets punish the firm for 
promotional expenditures, except insofar as they lead to increased unexpected 
exposures of the firm or brand name. 
 
Effect of Media Exposures and Expenditures on Firm Systematic Risk 
 
Based on our finding that media exposures and expenditures each affect firm 
stock returns in a distinct manner as well as on prior findings suggesting that 
advertising spending has a significant and negative effect on firm systematic risk 
(Singh et al. 2005 and McAlister et al. 2007), we investigate the effects of both media 
exposures and expenditures on systematic risk. Systematic risk is the firm’s exposure 
to macroeconomic risk that can’t be eliminated by investors through portfolio 
                                                 
16 We again conduct a robustness check to ensure that our results are not due to a few influential datapoints. 





diversification. Lowering this risk can lead to a lower cost of capital for the firm, 
potentially increasing future firm profitability (Lubatkin and O’Neill 1987). While 
prior research has found that advertising lowers a firm’s systematic risk, the extant 
literature has been unable to independently identify the effects of advertising 
exposures from advertising expenditures on this form of firm risk. We evaluate how 
both exposures and expenditures can seperately affect a firm’s systematic risk in the 
stadium naming rights context. Again, the nature of this context suggests that our 
results may inform us as to the nature of exposures and expenditures in other 
promotional communication contexts, such as advertising. 
We test these effects on firm systematic risk using data for North American 
major sports affiliated stadium naming rights agreements from 2001-2012. We collect 
the daily stock price, number of shares outstanding and dividends from CRSP for 
each firm for all years in which the stadium naming rights agreement is active and in 
which the firm reports financial results and advertising expenditures. In addition, we 
collect the annual firm sales, net income, and advertising expenditures from each 
firm’s annual reports for the years in which they report each of these metrics and have 
an active naming rights agreement. Finally, we collect the annual mentions of the 
stadium for each year within our analysis from the News Library database, 
augmented as in prior analyses for metropolitan areas without a major daily 
newspaper in this database. 
Using the daily financial data, we estimate the annual systematic risk for each 
firm in a standard manner consistent with McAlister et al. (2007). In order to find the 




relationship between market returns and firm returns, we estimate a CAPM for each 
firm-year pair (10). The value of the β1ij coefficient is found for each firm i in year j. 
This model is estimated using OLS and is conducted using each day t during year j. 














With this model, we calculate the systematic risk for 320 firm-years over 53 
firms. We use this set of estimated systematic risk values (“betas”) to independently 
study the effects of media exposures and expenditures. We estimate a variety of 
models in order to evaluate the robustness of our results to different modeling 
decisions and specifications. The simplest of these models involves no control for 
unobserved heterogeneity (11). We estimate this model with both a linear and a 
loglinear specification. 
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This model includes a lagged endogenous term controlling for firm systematic 
risk in the prior year. Prior empirical research on systematic risk suggests the use of 
this term to account for the slow rate of change in firm systematic risk (Chan and 
Chen 1991, Jostova and Philipov 2005, Gysels and Jacquier 2006, Ang and Chen 
2007, and Adrian and Franzoni 2009). We also include a set of indicator variables for 
the year of the observation (designated as year k) to control for any differences over 




the stadium name in the previous year and the annual expenditures on the stadium 
naming rights agreement.  
Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity, we estimate this model using OLS 
with robust standard errors and with FGLS, which is more efficient in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity than Maximum Likelihood estimation with robust standard errors 
(Carroll and Ruppert 1982). Using a Wooldridge test (Wooldridge 2002), which tests 
for autocorrelation in panel data, we find significant evidence for autocorrelation at 
the 90% level (p-value = 0.07). We account for autocorrelation by estimating the 
FGLS model using a panel-specific AR(1) model. Due to the nature of this model, we 
conduct this analysis only on observed stadiums with more than 2 observation years. 
Our sample size for this model is, therefore, smaller (287) than for the other 
specifications.  
We also estimate a pair of models controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
using random effects (12). A significant value for the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test on our empirical estimates suggests the importance of including 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of our model. A Hausman 
specification test indicates that the more efficient random effects method is most 
appropriate for dealing withunobserved heterogeneity in this instance. The standard 
random-effects model is estimated using GLS. 
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However, the standard random effects model is unable to test the effect of 
annual expenditures on the naming rights agreement, as these are time invariant 
within our context. Hausman and Taylor (1981) propose a manner to measure time 
invariant variables while still controlling for unobserved heterogeneity through the 
use of random effects. Specifically, they introduce an instrumental variable approach 
in which the assumption of exogeneity between the random effects and regressors is 
relaxed. This method, therefore, allows us to simultaneously deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity, time-invariant effects, and lagged endogenous terms within a single 
model.  
 The empirical results for each of these estimated models are presented in 
Table x.17 
Table x: Systematic Risk Results 
 
We find that regardless of model specification and estimation procedures, the 
number of media exposures for the firm lowers the firm’s systematic risk in 
                                                 
17 As a robustness check, we also calculated a Fixed Effects and Arellano-Bond estimator, finding that both 
methods provide negative and significant values for the effect of lagged media exposures on systematic risk. In 
addition, we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of firm financial data, such as firm sales, net 




subsequent years. The results for expenditures are somewhat inconsistent across 
different specifications. We find significant and positive effects of expenditures on 
firm systematic risk at the 99% level for the FGLS model accounting for 
heteroskedasticity between panels using an AR(1) specification for autocorrelation. 
We also show marginally significant increases in risk due to higher expenditures with 
the loglinear model and with the Hausman-Taylor estimate.18 
Discussion 
 
Our findings begin to bridge the gap between the financial/marketing interface 
literature and the broader marketing literature on how the effectiveness of paid 
marketing communications are measured. While prior marketing/finance interface 
research has focused exclusively on the effects of spending, which serves as a proxy 
for the overall effects of these paid communications, we more closely link this 
research to the broarder marketing literature, which focuses on a variety of measures 
and components of marketing communications.  
Based on our findings in a sponsorship context, media exposures drive 
positive financial effects for the firm, both increasing firm stock returns and 
decreasing firm risk. In contrast, promotional expenditures, when controlling for 
media exposures, lead to negative financial results, specifically decreasing stock 
returns and weakly increase firm systematic risk. These findings provide us with a 
richer understanding of how paid marketing communications impact a firm’s financial 
performance, increasing our theoretical understanding of the role of these 
                                                 
18 We also test that our results are not driven by the recession that occurred in our data window, which 
disproportionately affected some of the firms in our sample, especially those in the banking industry. We find 





communications and their effects for the firm. Our results underline the importance of 
actively managing a firm’s marketing communication strategy in order to maximize 
the number of exposures per dollar of expenditure. 
In addition, our results provide evidence of the importance of exposures for 
managing firm systematic risk. We find that exposures consistently lower a firm’s 
systematic risk, regardless of the modeling assumptions or included variables. In 
comparison, expenditures on these communications potentially increase a firm’s 
systematic risk depending on the modeling specification. These results suggest that 
the firm may actually lower the effectiveness of future marketing investments (as well 
as other investments) through the implementation of an inefficient (low number of 
exposures per dollar of expenditure) present communication strategy. This inefficient 
campaign leads to a higher cost of capital in the future, raisng the cost to the firm of 
future campaigns. These results serve to further highlight the importance of effective 
media planning as ineffective planning can hurt the firm’s financial performance over 
both the short- and long-term.  
This study contains several limitations that provide ample opportunities for 
future research. First, we only examine the effect of one form of promotion (stadium 
naming rights agreements). It is possible that with other forms of marketing 
communications, such as advertising, consumers or financial markets react to 
exposures and expenditures in a different manner. For example, exposures within the 
stadium naming rights context are relatively coarse, containing only the name and 
information about the association with the sports franchise and city. Other contexts, 




opportunity to further study how the information conveyed in marketing 
communications can directly impact a firm’s financial performance.  
In addition, our findings do not demonstrate the effects of either exposures or 
expenditures on firm idiosyncratic risk, which is the risk that is potentially diversified 
away by investors. As with systematic risk, firms prefer a lower idiosyncratic risk, 
due to cost of capital concerns. This offers a future research opportunity to study how 
different different measures of a paid marketing communication campaign can affect 
firm idiosyncratic risk.  
These results also don’t offer insights into whether exposures or expenditures 
affect a firm’s stock returns directly or indirectly through increases in firm sales as 
described by Joshi and Hanssens (2010). This potential extension would provide 
greater insight into how consumers receive information from paid marketing 
communications and how that information is incorporated into firm financial 
performance.  
Finally, this study only analyzes the financial effect of one driver of paid 
marketing communication’s effect, exposures, while attempting to limit the effects of 
other components, such as creative aspects. Future research is needed to continue to 
bridge the gap between the marketing/finance interface literature and the wider 








Through the use of the unique stadium naming rights agreement context, we 
are able to answer the question of how media exposures and associated expenditures 
can independently affect a firm’s financial performance. In doing so, we overcome 
the limitations that have previously plagued analyses on the financial effects of these 
paid marketing communication, which had not been able to clearly delineate the 
effects of exposures and expenditures due to the implicit relationship between these 
two variables. 
We find that the financial markets increase firm stock returns and lower firm 
systematic risk in response to an increase in exposures, while decreasing firm stock 
returns and weakly raising firm systematic risk in response to an increase in 
associated expenditures. These results suggest that financial markets reward the firm 
based on the number of exposures received rather than increasing firm value based 
solely on the increased allocation of assets to the firm’s budget for paid marketing 
communications.  
This study uses a unique context that allows for the isolation of exposures 
from expenditures to begin to bridge the gap between the marketing/finance interface 
literature and the broader marketing literature studying the effect of maketing 
communications. As such, our findings provide a richer understanding of how firm 
marketing communications can affect a firm’s financial performance. In the future, 
further research should develop our understanding of the financial impact of other 
drivers and measures of the effectiveness of marketing communications. It is 
important to continue to develop a richer understanding of how these communications 
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